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ABSTRACT
Recent trends in the software development practices (Agile, De-
vOps, CI) have shortened the development life-cycle causing the
need for efficient security-by-design approaches. In this context,
software architectures are analyzed for potential vulnerabilities and
design flaws. Yet, design flaws are often documented with natural
language and require a manual analysis, which is inefficient. Besides
low-level vulnerability databases (e.g., CWE, CAPEC) there is little
systematized knowledge on security design flaws. The purpose of
this work is to provide a catalog of security design flaws and to
empirically evaluate the inspection guidelines for detecting security
design flaws. To this aim, we present a catalog of 19 security de-
sign flaws and conduct empirical studies with master and doctoral
students. This paper contributes with: (i) a catalog of security de-
sign flaws, (ii) an empirical evaluation of the inspection guidelines
with master students, and (iii) a replicated evaluation with doctoral
students. We also account for the shortcomings of the inspection
guidelines and make suggestions for their improvement with re-
spect to the generalization of guidelines, catalog re-organization,
and format of documentation. We record similar precision, recall,
and productivity in both empirical studies and discuss the potential
for automating the security design flaw detection.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in software development, such as, Agile, DevOps, and
Continuous Integration (CI), have shortened the software develop-
ment life-cycle, impacting software security [8, 11]. For instance, CI
tightened release cycles to days, or sometimes hours. This limits the
activities that can take place for security analysis, causing the need
for efficient security-by-design approaches. In the design phase
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of the development life-cycle, software architectures are often an-
alyzed for potential design flaws and vulnerabilities. Knowledge
reuse is an important factor that can help raise the efficiency. For
instance, previous work ([2, 4, 22], to cite a few) has made use of
publicly available records of low-level security vulnerabilities, such
as CAPEC 1, CVE 2, CWE 3 to semi-automate the security analysis
of systems. On the level of software architecture, Garcia et al. [9]
introduce a catalog of architectural bad smells specified with UML
diagrams. Similarly, Bouhours et al. [5] contribute with a catalog
of 23 so called “spoiled patterns” or, architectural design antipat-
terns. Yet, the existing literature about architectural design flaws
[5, 9, 13, 14, 19] lacks a systematized knowledge about security-
relevant architectural design flaws. In addition, there is a lack of
practical inspection guidelines for identifying security design flaws
in software architectures.
This paper contributes with: (i) inspection guidelines accompa-
nied by a series of closed questions for detecting 19 security design
flaws, (ii) an experiment with master students investigating preci-
sion, recall, and productivity of the guidelines, and (iii) a replicated
experiment with doctoral students. In the replicated experiment
we track the problematic guidelines and suggest improvements
to the catalog with respect to: (a) generalizing the guidelines, b)
re-organizing the catalog, and c) format of documentation.
We record a relatively high precision (92.6%) and productivity
(11.5 TP/h). On the other hand, our results show that about half
of the security design flaws go unnoticed (average recall is 50.4%).
Similar measurements of precision and recall have been reported
in related empirical studies investigating knowledge-based manual
threat analysis techniques, i.e. STRIDE [17, 21]. We have found that
many participants have expressed doubts when detecting certain
security design flaws. We systematically track which guidelines
were problematic and provide an account for the re-occurring is-
sues. Accordingly, we suggest simple improvements to overcome
these issues. The detection guidelines can be currently used to
manually analyze software design. However, we see potential in
using these guidelines to automate the detection of security design
flaws. Specifically, the closed questions are already operationalized
to some extent, and can be easily transformed into graph queries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes
the guidelines for detecting security design flaws and shows how
they are used. Section 3 describes the experimental design and
execution. Section 4 presents the results and Section 5 suggests im-
provements for the guidelines. Section 7 lists the threats to validity,
while Section 6 discusses the related work. We conclude the paper
in Section 8.
1https://capec.mitre.org
2https://www.cvedetails.com
3https://cwe.mitre.org
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Table 1: A list of the proposed security design flaws.
Name Description
Missing authentication An absence of an auth. mechanism in the system.
Authentication bypass The auth. mechanism does not cover all possible
entry points to the system.
Relying on single factor auth. The auth. mechanisms rely on the use of passwords.
Insuff. session management Sessions are notmanaged securely throughout their
life-cycle.
Downgrade authentication Possibility to authenticate with a weaker (or obso-
lete) auth mechanism.
Insuff. crypto key manage-
ment
Keys are not managed securely throughout their
life-cycle.
Missing authorization An absence of an authorization mechanism in the
system.
Missing access control An absence of access control in the system.
No Re-authentication An absence of re-authentication during critical op-
erations.
Unmonitored execution Uncontrolled resource consumption due to interac-
tions with external entities.
No context when authorizing An absence of conditional checks for access control.
Not revoking authorization An absence of a process for revoking user access.
Insecure data storage Storage of sensitive data is in clear or weak access
control mechanisms are in place.
Insuff. credentials manage-
ment
Credentials are not managed securely throughout
their life-cycle.
Insecure data exposure Sensitive data is transported in clear text.
Use of custom/weak encryp-
tion
Generating small keys, using obsolete encryption
schemes.
Not validating input/data Absence of validation checks when receiving data
from external entities.
Insuff. auditing Access to critical resources or operations is not
logged.
Uncontrolled resource con-
sumption
Uncontrolled resource consumption of internal
components.
Design Flaw 1: Missing authentication
Description This refers to the absence of an authentication mechanism in the
system. Apart from external entities, like users or other systems the
system may interact with, authentication may be necessary within the
system between processes/components/datastores that are located in
different trust boundaries.
Detection
• Consider the external entities (users/subsystems) that interact with the
system and which assets of the system they can access.
• Determine the processes that interact with high-value assets in the system.
• For each interaction examine:
– If it is an entity: Does the entity go through an authentication point in
order to access the asset?
– If it is a process: Is the identity of a process accessing datastores or
processes in a different part of the system (trust boundaries – requires
different privilege levels) verified?
Listing 1: Textual description of the missing authentication
design flaw.
2 SECURITY DESIGN FLAWS CATALOG
This section gives a short description of the developed security
design flaws catalog. We refer the interested reader for a complete
catalog to [10].
Table 1 shows the security design flaws and their descriptions.
The catalog is a list of 19 design flaws related to issues with au-
thentication, access control, authorization, availability of resources,
integrity and confidentiality of data. The catalog entries consist
of (a) the name of the design flaw, (b) a description (using natural
language), and (c) a series of closed questions that serve as detection
guidelines. Listing 1 shows the first catalog entry. The catalog was
Figure 1: A high-level DFD of the experimental object.
compiled by systematically filtering vulnerability database entries
(CVE, CWE, OWASP4, and SANS5) and existing threat and vul-
nerability taxonomies. The final catalog entries were obtained by
grouping a filtered subset of database entries and taxonomies. The
authors grouped the entries whenever the vulnerabilities could be
caused by the same design-level issues. For instance, they relate 3
CWE entries (287, 306, and 862) to the security design flaw “Missing
authentication” (Listing 1). The CWE entry 287 is a description of
an improper authentication, where the software is not able to prove
the identify of the actors in the system. Entry 306 is a description
of commonly missing (re)authentication mechanisms when criti-
cal functions are executed. Finally the entry 862 is describing the
weakness of missing authorization mechanisms system actors com-
municating with the system. All the above entries are describing
weaknesses related to external entities or critical processes commu-
nicating with the system without an authentication mechanism in
place. Therefore, the design issue causing all three entries is missing
authentication. A detailed procedure of the catalog compilation can
be found in [10].
3 EMPIRICAL EXPERIMENTS
Research questions. We conducted two controlled experiments with
participants to investigate the efficiency and effectiveness of using
existing guidelines for detecting security design flaws in a software
architecture. The first experiment was conducted by the second
and third author with master students. The second experiment was
conducted by the first author with doctoral students. We were inter-
ested to measure the efficiency and effectiveness of the guidelines
in both experiments. We observe effectiveness of the guidelines
with a measure of precision and recall, and efficiency with a mea-
sure of productivity. This study focuses on the following research
questions.
RQ1.What is the precision, recall, and productivity of the proposed
guidelines for security design flaw detection?
RQ2. What are the shortcomings and benefits of the proposed
guidelines for security design flaw detection?
Experimental object. Figure 1 shows the context DFD of the ex-
perimental object. The Home Monitoring System (HomeSys) is
a system for remotely monitoring private residents. Its purpose
is to provide the infrastructure and functionalities for customers
to automatically receive and manage notifications about critical
events in their homes. In principle, the system consists of a gateway
communicating with sensors, and a cloud system collecting data
from gateways and displaying it on customer dashboards. Sensors
are analog or digital hardware devices that produce measurements
and send them to the gateway. Actuators are hardware devices that
4https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_Top_Ten_Project
5https://www.sans.org/top25-software-errors/
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can receive commands from the gateway, like for instance, taking a
picture, activating a buzzer or flicking a switch. The gateway is a
hardware device which relays measurements to the cloud (via a 3G
or WiFi network) and manages the actuators in the residency. The
cloud is a software system which communicates with the gateways
and provides services for the customers.
The system documentation (about 30 pages) includes (1) the
description of the problem domain with scenarios, (2) the require-
ments of the system including non-functional requirements and (3)
a hierarchically decomposed architecture specified with UML (e.g,
deployment diagram). The complete description of the system has
been used in previous studies [21] and is open to the public. The
participants were tasked to read the preparatory material (including
the system documentation) before the experiment took place. Email
reminders were sent out before-hand. The documentation of the
system does not include security requirements, as the purpose of
this exercise is to derive those from the detected design flaws.
Participants. The participants of this study are three master-level
students and three doctoral candidates in computer science and
engineering disciplines. We excluded one report handed in by a
master student as the task was not taken seriously. All the partici-
pants had experience with modeling, basic security concepts, and
UML notations used in the system documentation. The participants
in the second experiment were doctoral candidates in software
engineering with a master degree in computer science and engi-
neering. They have worked with modeling before, and were familiar
with basic security concepts and the notations used for describing
the experimental object. We have made sure that the participants
were able to complete the task before starting the experiment. The
participants performed the task individually.
Task. In essence, the participants were tasked to go through
each entry in the catalog, use the guidelines to detect flaws in the
HomeSys design, and document the identified flaws. The guidelines
prescribe detecting a subset of elements in the architecture for in-
spection, therefore the participants had to also indicate the location
of the identified flaw. For each architectural element under inspec-
tion, the guidelines provide a list of closed questions. A negative
answer indicates the existence of a design flaw for that element.
In case of insufficient information in the documentation, the par-
ticipants were instructed to report a design flaw, anyway. If they
thought a particular entry was not applicable in the system under
examination due to some restrictions or regulations in the domain,
they were instructed to mark that entry as not applicable. Finally,
the participants handed in all the printed documents, including the
filled-in form documenting the detected flaws.
Execution. Before the execution of the first experiment, four
participants were selected due to having successfully completed a
master level course on advanced software architecture. Therefore,
they were familiar with basic concepts of software architecture
design, and have studied analyzing architectures for security in
the context of this course. On the day of the first experiment, the
participants were gathered in a classroom. They were given printed
copies of (i) a one-page task description (ii) the HomeSys docu-
mentation, (iii) the catalog of security design flaws as described
in Section 2, and (iv) a form for documenting the identified flaws.
Regular breaks were allowed during which the experimenters made
sure the participants did not compare solutions.
Before the execution of the second experiment, preparatory read-
ing was handed out via electronic mail (2 weeks in advance). The
preparatory reading included the same documents used in the first
experiment. Regular email reminders were sent until the last day
before the execution. On the day of the experiment, the participants
met the experimenter for an individual session on faculty premises.
They was given printed copies of all the documents (i-iv). The first
author explained their task again and briefly described the printed
documents. Only procedural questions were answered during the
experiment. Due to the complexity of the task, no strict time limit
was enforced, short breaks were permitted, and accounted for.
Measures. We adopt the same ground truth and measures of pre-
cision, recall, and productivity in both experiments. The ground
truth was re-assessed after the first experiment to ensure it’s cor-
rectness. It consists of 48 security design flaws. Conventionally,
precision (TP/(TP + FP)) is measured as a ratio between the true
positives (i.e., correctly identified flaws) and all identified flaws
(including the false flaws). A true positive (TP) is a correctly iden-
tified security design flaw. This entails that the documented flaw
exists also in the ground truth and is identified at the same lo-
cation of the architecture. A false positive (FP) is an incorrectly
identified and documented flaw that does not exist in the ground
truth. Recall (TP/(TP + FN )) is measured as a ratio between the
true positives and all correctly identified flaws (including the over-
looked flaws). A false negative (FN ) is a design flaw that exists
in the ground truth but has not been documented. Productivity
(TP/h) is measured as the amount of correctly identified flaws per
hour. We measured the time it took for the participants to complete
the task and subtract the time that was lost during the breaks. We
include an additional measure for keeping track of the guidelines
the participants struggled with. We flag the TP , FP , FN whenever
the participant expressed that there was insufficient information
(I I ) to determine the existence of a flaw. If a correctly identified
flaw (TP) is flagged with I I this means that the participant has
identified the correct flaw in the correct location in the architecture,
has documented this in the hand-in, but has also expressed doubt
due to missing information in the documentation. If an overlooked
flaw (FN ) is flagged with I I this means that the participant failed
to identify the correct flaw but also expressed doubt due to missing
information.
4 RESULTS
Table 2 summarizes the results of both experiments. First, we have
calculated the average precision, recall, and productivity for both
experiments separately. On average, participants 4-6 from Table 2
performed slightly better compared to participants 1-3 (avg 97.1%
precision vs. 88.1%, avg 52.5% recall vs. 48.2%, 14.8TP/h productiv-
ity vs. 8.3TP/h). Yet, these differences are small and not significant.
The performance differences between experiments can be explained
by the different level of education. Henceforth we refer to the accu-
mulatedTP , FP , FN , measures of precision, recall, and productivity
of the inspection guidelines.
Precision, recall, and productivity. On average, the participants
identified about half (23.7/48) of the security design flaws correctly.
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Table 2: Results from both experiments (accumulated result
are in bold).
Design Flaws Measure
Participant ID TP FP FN P [%] R [%] Prod [T P/h]
M
Sc
1 23 2 24 92 48.9 9.5
2 26 3 21 89.7 55.3 9.4
3 19 4 28 82.6 40.4 6
Avg 22.7 3 24.3 88.1 48.2 8.3
Ph
D
4 24 1 23 96 51.1 8.2
5 20 1 27 95.2 42.6 8.5
6 30 0 17 100 63.8 17.7
Avg 24.7 0.7 22.3 97.1 52.5 14.8
Total Avg 23.7 1.8 23.3 92.6 50.4 11.5
Yet, on average only about 2 reported security design flaws were
incorrect (FP). Therefore, the average precision is quite high (92.6
%). The low number of FPs may indicate that the inspection guide-
lines were not misleading the participants towards a false design
flaw discovery. On the other hand, about half of the flaws were
overlooked. On average, the recall is measured at 50.4 %. This result
is not surprising. Similar measurement of precision and recall have
been reported in related empirical studies investigating manual
knowledge-based threat analysis techniques, i.e., STRIDE [17, 21].
In general, high precision and low recall may be a common trait for
techniques that manually analyze software architectures. Finally, on
average the participants spent about 2.5 hours to complete the task.
The average productivity of the approach is 11.5 correct threats
per hour. This result is more surprising, as the related literature re-
ports a much lower number of correctly identified threats per hour
(1.8 TP/h in [17] and about 4 TP/h in [21]). This can be explained
by the different goals of threat analysis techniques vs detection
of design flaws. Threat analysis techniques help to systematically
identify security threats on the level of software architecture. The
security threats are considered correct only when a realistic attack
scenario is found. Finding a realistic scenario requires thinking
about possible attack paths and how to break into the system. This
may be cognitively more demanding than answering a set of closed
questions about the architectural design.
Insufficient Information. In the second experiment, we measure
which guidelines posed problems to our participants. Particularly,
we flag correctly identified and overlooked flaws with Insufficient
Information (II). To this aim, we have re-assessed the data collected
in both experiments. A FN was flagged when the participant re-
ported the flaw, but never specified the location due to missing
information. A FN was also flagged when the participant did not
report the flaw, but made notes about missing information next
to the check-list in the catalog. Incorrectly identified flaws (FP)
were never flagged. The participants never expressed doubt about
missing information when making a mistake.
Table 3 shows the flagged TP , FP , which flaw they relate to,
and how many participants expressed the same doubts. We have
recorded that 25.2% (71/282) of all reported TP and FN from Ta-
ble 2 (ΣTP + ΣFN = 282) were flagged with I I . Visibly, security
design flaws 4, 12, 15, and 18 seem to be problematic. These design
flaws were often subject to missing information, for more than one
Table 3: Flaws flagged with insufficient information (I I )
(problematic flaws are in bold).
Flaw ID TP (Participant ID) FN (Participant ID) Σ
2 4 (6) 0 4
3 1 (6) 0 1
4 7 (1,2,3,6) 3 (3,5) 10
7 0 4 (5) 4
9 8 (1,2) 0 8
12 3 (1,2) 11 (1,2,5,6) 14
13 2 (6) 2 (6) 4
14 2 (5,6) 0 2
15 1 (6) 15 (1,2,5,6) 16
17 2 (5) 2 (6) 4
18 0 2 (3,4) 2
19 2 (6) 0 2
Total 32 39 71
participant. This may indicate that some guidelines assume the
availability of detailed information about the system (information
that is rarely available in the design phase). In addition, we have
gathered participants feedback in the exit questionnaire. We asked
the participants about what they did not like about the approach.
Some participants referred to missing information. For instance:
“I felt that the approach and the architecture were too detached,
and that I needed much more information that what was
provided in the architecture to complete the analysis properly.”
This confirms that the participants indeed had problems with some
of the guidelines. In particular we have identified three kind of
problems, and suggest improvements in what follows.
5 SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING THE
INSPECTION GUIDELINES
In what follows we describe three type of problems we encoun-
tered with the proposed guidelines, and provide suggestions for
improvement.
Guidelines generalization.We analyze the problematic guidelines
related to design flaws 4 and 15. Both guidelines are not general
enough to be useful for a design-level analysis. We have observed
this trend in other guidelines as well (namely, 12, 18).
Listing 2 shows the guidelines related to security design flaw 4.
Overall, participants still managed to correctly identify this flaw
despite having doubts due to missing information (c.f., Table 3).
They were able to do so as some question posed for detection are
in fact very useful (e.g., Is the user required to re-authenticate after a
period of time?) and can be answered at design time. One possible
explanation for our participants expressing doubts is that there were
too many technical questions posed for detection. For instance, Is
the session ID tied to other properties like IP, SSL,? The properties of
the session IDs are technology-dependent. The choice of technology
is decided in later stages of the development life-cycle [12].
Listing 3 shows the guidelines related to security design flaw 15.
Compared to the previous flaw, these guidelines are much shorter.
All three questions posed for flaw detection are very technical. For
instance, Is the reuse of packets prevented (Replay attacks)? The par-
ticipants did not know about replay attacks are, or how to counter
them. This may have caused the participants to simply ignore this
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Design Flaw 4: Insufficient Session Management
Description Not managing a session properly throughout its life-cycle can leave
the system vulnerable to session hijacking attacks. Session management
involves creation (the session should be established through a secure
channel and session identifier should be encrypted), the time frame the
session is active (an attacker might attempt to reuse the session ID to
gain access) and its destruction/invalidation (proper session invalida-
tion should take place when the user logs out or session timeout. Not
terminating sessions can also lead to resource depletion).
Detection
• Determine which sessions are established in the system and between
which endpoints.
• For each session examine:
– Is the session established through a secure channel?
– Is the session ID encrypted when in transit?
– Is the session ID hard to guess?
– Is the use of session ID as a parameter in URLs prevented?
– Is the session ID validated on server side?
– Are secure cookies used?
– Is the session ID tied to other user properties like IP, SSL session ID?
– Can the same session be accessed simultaneously from two endpoints?
Should it?
– Is session timeout set? Is it the minimum possible value?
– Is the session invalidated on logout?
– Is the session ID renewed in the event of privilege change?
– Is there a mechanism to monitor the creation/destruction and attempts
to connect to a session?
– Is the user required to re-authenticate after a period of inactivity?
Listing 2: Textual description of the insufficient session
management design flaw.
Design Flaw 15: Insecure Data Exposure
Description Data is not transferred in a secure way. For example a web applica-
tion uses the HTTP instead of HTTPS. This leaves the channel vulnerable
to eavesdropping, Man In The Middle (MITM) attacks etc.
Detection
• Locate the valuable information in the model.
• Track them through the architecture to determine where and how they
are transferred.
• At each step examine the following:
– Is the reuse of packets prevented (Replay attacks)?
– Is there any form of timestamping, message sequencing or checksum
in the exchanged packages?
– Is the traffic over an encrypted channel (SSL/TLS)?
Listing 3: Textual description of the insecure data exposure
design flaw.
flaw without even finding the possible locations, and making a note
about missing information (resulting in a flagged FN ).
Listing 4 introduces a few simple improvements. First, the de-
scription of the design flaw is shortened and redundant questions
removed. For example, session timeout directly relates to the last
posed question Is the user required to re-authenticate after a period of
inactivity? Second, the questions posed for detection that were too
specific were removed. For instance, the usage of secure cooking is
technology-dependent.
This kind of improvement could help to relate the guidelines
to a design-level description, making them easier to apply. In the
exit questionnaire we also ask the participants for their sugges-
tions for improvement. Generally, the participants suggested simi-
lar improvements. One participant even suggested to have several
versions of the same guideline but on different level of abstraction:
Design Flaw 4.1: Insufficient Session Management
Description Not managing a session properly throughout its life-cycle can leave
the system vulnerable to session hijacking attacks. Session management
involves the creation, the time frame the session is active, and its destruc-
tion. The attacker may attempt to disrupt or manipulate these processes
for her gain.
Detection
• Determine which sessions are established in the system and between
which endpoints.
• For each session examine:
– Is the session established through a secure channel?
– Is the session ID hard to guess?
– Is the session ID protected when in transit (e.g., encrypted)?
– Is there a process for validating the session ID on server side?
– Is the session destructed (or invalidated) on logout?
– Is the session ID renewed in the event of privilege change?
– Is the user required to re-authenticate after a period of inactivity?
Listing 4: Textual description of the improved insufficient
session management design flaw.
“Maybe divide the 19 points [Security Design Flaws] into classes
based on what level of design is provided.”
Overlapping guidelines. Most participants agreed that the ap-
proach takes too much time. We found that many guidelines are
overlapping and could be compressed and re-organized. In addi-
tion, as per comparing guidelines in Listing 2 and Listing 3, the
guidelines are not well balanced in length and complexity. For in-
stance, the guidelines in Listing 3 try to help detecting where data
can be leaked in transit. Yet, the proposed catalog contains another
set of guidelines to detect the design flaw for insecure data storage
(Flaw 13). Detecting both flaws requires to first identify valuable
information and track it through the architecture. Therefore, merg-
ing them and removing redundant questions would help speed
up the manual detection. The exit questionnaire revealed that the
participants generally agree with this notion. For instance, two
participants criticized the categorization of guidelines:
“Maybe I would not categorize them [Security Design Flaws 1-19]
so much. Having 5-10 [questions] under the same category does
not always represents the category.”
“Try to group the items of the list (e.g., there are many references
to encryption scattered through all the guidelines).”
Table 4 suggests a reorganization of the proposed guidelines. Im-
plementing such a restructuring (incl. the removal of redundant
guidelines) could result in half the original size of the catalog (9
vs 19). A closer look into the guidelines showed that many secu-
rity design flaws were very similar. For instance, the guidelines for
detecting missing authorization and missing access control were
asking the user for the same kind of information twice. We also
suggest to gather all encryption-related guidelines and group them
into one comprehensive guideline (Missing/weak encryption). We
suggest the removal of one security design flaw altogether, namely
Not validating input/data as missing field validation is a bad pro-
gramming practice, rather than a design flaw.
Tedious documentation. Finally, in the exit-questionnaire, partici-
pants have expressed a dislike for navigating through documents
and documenting the flaws. For instance, when asked if the ap-
proach takes too much time, one participant responded:
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Table 4: Suggestion for re-organization of the proposed
guidelines.
Old New
ID Name ID Name
1 Missing authentication 1 Missing authentication
2 Authentication bypass
3 Relying on single factor auth 2 Weak authentication
5 Downgrade authentication
9 No Re-authentication
14 Insuff. credentials management
6 Insuff. crypto key management 3 Missing/weak encryption
16 Use of custom/weak encryption
7 Missing authorization 4 Missing authorization
8 Missing access control
11 No context when authorizing 5 Weak authorization
12 Not revoking authorization
13 Insecure data storage 6 Leaking important data
15 Insecure data exposure
10 Unmonitored execution 7 Uncontrolled resources
19 Uncontrolled resource consumption
17 Not validating input/data -
18 Insuff. auditing 8 Insuff. auditing
4 Insuff. session management 9 Insuff. session management
“Yes, especially since you have to go through all the different
documents.”
Another participant responded:
“Yes, some of the questions covered many parts of the system
which lead to a journey on finding information.”
The participants had to answer not only the closed questions next
to the guidelines, but also fill-in a form with a list of identified flaws
and their description. This resulted in a waste of time and could
have only decreased the level of concentration.
First, for future studies, we suggest to minimize the amount of
different documents handed out to participants. Second, we suggest
minor changes in the format of the guidelines. Along-side each
closed question, there should be (i) an obligatory field to specify
the location in the architecture, (ii) optional filed for marking a
flaw as not applicable, (iii) optional field for notes. Finally, we sug-
gest to remove the additional form with hand-written descriptions
of identified design flaws. Having these changes in place would
mean the users only work with two documents: one describing
the architecture, and one with the guidelines and identified flaws.
Automation and tool support would also help reduce this problem.
6 RELATEDWORK
This section positions the paper in the context of existing literature
on catalogs of design flaws, vulnerabilities, architectural bad smells,
anti-patterns, and knowledge-based threat analysis techniques.
Catalogs of security design flaws. Da Silva and Cecilia [6] have
compiled a catalog of common architectural weaknesses (Common
Architectural Weakness Enumeration, CAWE). The authors identify
and categorize common types of vulnerabilities rooted in software
architecture design and provide mitigations to address such vulner-
abilities. Da Silva and Cecilia [6] also analyze the vulnerabilities of
four real systems to discover their cause and find that up to 35%
vulnerabilities were rooted in the architectural design. Similar to
our work, the authors investigate which security patterns are likely
to have associated vulnerabilities. However, the proposed catalog
is not evaluated with an empirical study. As a result of initiatives
launched by IEEE Computer Society, Arce et al. [3] compiled a
list of top 10 security design flaws and discuss how to avoid them.
The practical examples that showcase the flaws are very useful
for understanding the impacts of each flaw. Some catalog entires
by Hosseini and Malamas [10] are aligned to top 10 security de-
sign flaws. For instance, Flaw 6 (insufficient cryptographic keys
management) in [10] relates to the “use cryptography correctly”
flaw. Yet, the purpose of the top 10 security design flaws was to
raise awareness among software architects about the most common
issues that have been the leading cause for security breaches in
practice. The purpose of this paper was to re-evaluate detection
guidelines and provide improvement suggestions for automating
the detection.
Vulnerability databases. Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE) (launched in 1999) is the largest and most updated vulnera-
bility database. Maintained by the MITRE corporation, it provides
a publicly available list of most common security vulnerabilities
with unique identifiers. Common Weakness enumeration (CWE)
is a community-developed list of common software security weak-
nesses. CWE aids developers and security practitioners since it
serves as a common language for describing security weaknesses
in architecture and implementation. It also provides different miti-
gation and prevention techniques that could be used to eliminate
weaknesses.
Architectural bad smells and anti-patterns. The literature on ar-
chitectural bad smells [9, 19] and anti-patterns [5, 13, 14] collides
with our work for what concerns the ambition to find and remove
architectural issues that negatively impact system life-cycle prop-
erties (extensibility, maintainability, testability, etc.). In contrast,
our work investigates security design flaws, that is architectural
design decisions that negatively impact the system security. Mo
et al. [13] have recently developed an automated detection of 6
architectural anti-patterns and study their impact on error and
change-proneness of the related files. The authors analyze 100 in-
dustrial software projects with respect to the project structural
information and revision history. They find that there only a few
distinct types of anti-patterns that occur in all the projects, where
Unstable Interface and Crossing were by far the largest culprits of
error and change-proneness. In contrast to our paper, the authors
detect the anti-patterns based on existing implementation. Our
work is focused on detecting security design flaws at the level of
architectural models. Bouhours et al. [5] introduce a catalog of
‘spoiled patterns’ and use it to automatically detect their manifes-
tation in software architecture models. They develop a plug-in for
the Neptune environment (UML, XML) which supports the instan-
tiation of spoiled patterns and suggest model transformations for
re-factoring the design models. Nafees et al. [14] propose a new
template for detecting architectural anti-patterns and a catalog of 12
Vulnerability Anti-Patterns (VAP) entries. The authors also provide
some examples of the proposed VAP entries. Yet, the catalog has
not yet been evaluated empirically. Taibi and Lenarduzzi [19] have
conducted interviews with 72 developers to collect a catalog of 11
microservice-specific bad smells. Besides the 11 smells, the authors
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put forward the importance of carefully analyzing the connections
between microservices, especially the connections leading to pri-
vate data and shared libraries. Similar to this work, the purpose of
compiling such a catalog is to help practitioners in the detection of
bad architectural decisions. Garcia et al. [9] describe 4 architectural
bad smells identified through an in-depth analysis of two industrial
systems. The architectural smells are described in detail and are
accompanied with UML component diagrams, and a discussion of
their impact on quality.
Knowledge-based Architectural Threat Analysis. Architectural
threat analysis consists of techniques and methods that are used
for systematically analyzing the attacker’s profile vis-a-vis assets
of value to organizations. Such techniques are often performed on
models representing the software architecture of a system. The pur-
pose of analyzing security threats at this stage is to ultimately iden-
tify security holes and plan for necessary security solutions. There-
fore, we consider existing literature that makes use of knowledge
base (threat catalogs, vulnerability data bases, etc.) [1, 2, 4, 7, 18]
to perform such analysis as related work. We refer the interested
reader to a systematic literature review [20] for a more detailed list
of knowledge-based threat analysis techniques.
7 THREATS TO VALIDITY
With respect to internal validity threats, we consider the threat of
using graduate and doctoral students as participants. Using stu-
dents during empirical studies has been criticized in the past, as
their background knowledge is not that of industrial practitioners.
However, studies have shown [15, 16] that the differences between
the performance of professionals and graduate students are often
limited. To counter this threat we have made sure that the selected
participants had sufficient background education to complete the
tasks. We also consider the threat of an unrepresentative sample
size (in total seven participants). In addition, the suggestions for
improvement have not been empirically evaluated.
With respect to external threats to validity, we consider the threat
to generalizability of results. This study is conducted only on one ex-
perimental subject, thus the results can not be generalized to other
domains. To counter this threat, we plan to conduct more studies,
including security experts, and different experimental subjects.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a catalog of security design flaws accompa-
nied by inspection guidelines for their detection. To evaluate our
approach, we present two empirical studies with master students
and doctoral candidates. We conduct two experiments investigating
the performance of manually applying the inspection guidelines
in the context of analyzing a home monitoring system. The main
contributions of this work are three-fold: (i) a catalog of security de-
sign flaws, (ii) an empirical evaluation of the inspection guidelines
with master students, and (iii) a replicated evaluation with doctoral
students. We also account for the shortcomings of the inspection
guidelines and make suggestions for their improvement with re-
spect to the generalization of guidelines, catalog re-organization,
and format of documentation. Our results show a relatively high
performance (92.6) and productivity (11.5TP/h). On the other hand,
we found that about half of the security design flaws go unnoticed
(average recall is 50.4%). We introduce an additional measure to
investigate which guidelines posed problems to our participants.
We identify three type of problems the participants encountered.
First, some guidelines were not general enough to be useful for
detecting security design flaws. Second, several closed questions
used for detection were overlapping, potentially resulting in loss
of time. Lastly, participants have expressed a dislike for the format
of documenting the flaws. We suggest simple improvements of the
guidelines to support future automation.
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